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NOTES
Involuntary Confessions and the Jailhouse
Informant: An Examination of Arizona
v. Fulminante
By ELIZABETH A. GANONG*
Introduction
Confessions' made by crime suspects traditionally have been a part
of the American system of criminal law,2 and "remain a proper element
in law enforcement." 3 For a confession to be admissible at trial, the de-
fendant must make the confession voluntarily.4 For nearly a century,5
the United States Supreme Court has prohibited involuntary statements6
that the government 7 uses at trial in violation of a defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' The Court also has ex-
pressed its contempt for involuntary confessions that the government ex-
tracts through interrogation techniques "so offensive to a civilized system
of justice" 9 that they violate a defendant's due process rights. 10 The
Court's suspicion of defendant confessions obtained through interroga-
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., Bowdoin College, 1989.
1. "[In order to constitute a confession, a statement of accused must admit guilt, explic-
itly or implicitly, including all elements of a crime, by statement of details or admission of
ultimate fact." 23 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 878 (1989).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
3. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 878 (1989). See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
4. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
5. See id
6. The terms "involuntary statements," "involuntary confessions," and "coerced confes-
sions" are used interchangeably for the purposes of this Note.
7. For the purposes of this Note, different terms such as "government," .state," "law
enforcement agency," and "police" are all used interchangeably to describe the official govern-
ment agency against whom the question of state action is measured. See infra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text.
8. See Bram, 168 U.S. 532. See infra note 31 and accompanying text for a description of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
9. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985).
10. Id See infra note 37 and accompanying text for a description of an individual's due
process rights.
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tion led to the 1966 decision, Miranda v. Arizona.1" In Miranda, the
Court opined that the coercive atmosphere inherent in a custodial inter-
rogation could potentially overbear the will of the interrogated suspect
and strip the suspect of the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination."2 The Miranda decision provided law enforcement
agencies with strict guidelines regarding the interrogation of crime sus-
pects. 3 These protections remain in force today.
Although many safeguards14 have been created to prevent coerced
confessions, loopholes remain. The government can elicit incriminating
statements against the will of the individual without violating the guide-
lines set forth in Miranda.5 Unless the government's conduct in ex-
tracting the statements is patently in violation of due process, a court
may consider the statements voluntary.
One circumstance which may evoke such a statement is the govern-
ment's use of an undercover jailhouse informant.' 6 The informant, act-
ing as an agent for the government, may create or exploit a situation in
which the informant is not required to follow the judicially mandated
safeguards of Miranda.7 The informant creates pressure so great, how-
ever, that the accused's only option is to make an incriminating state-
ment. In Illinois v. Perkins,"8 the United States Supreme Court
concluded that an undercover agent need not inform an incarcerated sus-
pect of the Miranda protections before interrogating the suspect about a
crime unrelated to the one for which the suspect is incarcerated.' 9 The
Court reasoned that "[t]he essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated
atmosphere' and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated per-
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. Id. at 444-46.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 444-45.
15. The Miranda guidelines are not violated when the government properly invokes the
guidelines' use or the situation that exists is one in which the guidelines do not apply. See infra
part I.D.2 for specific circumstances in which the Miranda warnings do not apply.
16. "The term 'informant' refers generically to any person who provides information to a
law enforcement agency." Evan Haglund, Impeaching the Underworld Informant, 63 S. CAL.
L. R v. 1405, 1408 (1990). The term "jailhouse informant" traditionally has been used to
describe a person who "informs law enforcement officers of 'confessions' made by cellmates."
Id. at 1409. "Jailhouse informant" will be used in this Note in a limited manner. It will be
used to describe a prisoner with an established informant relationship with a law enforcement
agency or undercover agents who pose as prisoners. The role of the jailhouse informant is an
active one; to gather incriminating evidence from the targeted suspect. If thejailhouse inform-
ant is a prisoner who is acting as an informant for the government, then that informant's
compensation for the gathered information is monetary compensation, leniency in sentencing,
or immunity. The term jailhouse informant is not used in this Note to describe a prisoner who
passively overhears a suspect offer incriminating evidence and wishes to exchange this infor-
mation for some type of compensation. See infra note 24.
17. See infra part I.D.2.
18. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
19. Id.
son speaks freely to someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate."" °
A loophole exists where the suspect is not aware of the informant's
identity as an undercover agent, yet overwhelming compulsion exists as a
result of the informant's presence or actions. The compulsion is present
for reasons other than the informant's true identity, such as the subjec-
tive fears that the suspect harbors or statements and promises made by
the agent.
In the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Arizona v.
Fulminante,2 1 the Court addressed the voluntariness of a confession
made by an inmate to an informant posing as a fellow prisoner. This
Note examines circumstances in Fulminante, and those similar to them,
in which an informant may elicit involuntary confessions. This Note also
examines how loopholes in a defendant's legal protection may allow a
court to find the defendant's confessions admissible, and will finally offer
some alternatives to the present use of a jailhouse informant.
Part I examines the historical background of the Supreme Court's
test for determining admissibility and voluntariness of a confession. It
explores the relationship between involuntary confessions, due process,
and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In addi-
tion, Part I sets forth the judicially mandated safeguards that the
Supreme Court has provided. Part II, concentrating on the recent
Supreme Court case, Arizona v. Fulminante,22 illustrates situations in
'which the use of an undercover jailhouse informant can overcome the
defendant's will and thus result in an involuntary confession. Part III
exposes the dangers of using ajailhouse informant and demonstrates how
the use of one may contribute to an unreliable confession. This part
weighs the problems inherent in eliciting such unreliable confessions
against the social policies behind the use of a jailhouse informant as a
valuable participant in the effective apprehension of criminals. Part III
also offers a resolution to this dilemma of using a jailhouse informant.
Part IV summarizes the state of a defendant's protections against invol-
untary confessions under the current laws and concludes that the recent
limitation of the Miranda safeguards and the traditional due process pro-
tections are an inadequate protection against an incarcerated suspect's
involuntary confessions to a jailhouse informant.
This Note assumes that because the jailhouse informant acts as an
agent23 of a law enforcement agency, the police or government partici-
pates in the interrogation to a degree sufficient to constitute state action.
20. Id. at 2397.
21. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
22. Id.
23. "The law of agency is based on the Latin maxim, 'Qui facit per alium, facit per se,'
which may be translated 'One acting by another is acting for himself.'" 2A C.J.S. Agency § 2
(1972). "An agent is one who, by the authority of another, undertakes to transact some busi-
ness or manage some affairs on account of such other, and to render an account of it. He is a
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State action is a required element in a due process violation cause of
action.24
Because this Note examines loophole situations in which a defend-
ant's constitutional rights are left unprotected, the focus of this Note is
quite narrow. The core of this Note is the determination of whether a
prisoner's confession to a jailhouse informant satisfies the requirements
for voluntariness in terms of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A
confession's voluntariness is a two-fold constitutional issue.25 It is both a
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination and Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments due process concern. This Note, however, primarily focuses on
voluntariness as a due process concern. As seen by recent decisions, due
process is the current focus of the Court26 in its determination of whether
a confession is voluntary.
I. Historical Background of the Admissibility of Confessions
A. Early Confession Cases and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
Brain v. United States
Early confession cases in the United States Supreme Court displayed
an intolerance for involuntary confessions, yet "emerged from federal
prosecutions and were settled on a nonconstitutional basis."27 The com-
mon-law rule was that "the absence of inducements, promises, and
threats made a confession voluntary and admissible."2 In the 1897 case
Brain v. United States,29 the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to embody the common-
law rule against involuntary confessions.30 The Court held that "[in
substitute, or deputy, appointed by his principal primarily to bring about business relations
between the latter and third persons." Id § 4(c).
In Arizona v. Fulminante, the principal case discussed in this Note, it was stipulated at a
pre-trial hearing on the confession's voluntariness that "Anthony Sarivola was at all times
pertinent to this case a paid confidential informant for the F.B.I." Joint Appendix at 10, 30-31,
40, 42-43, Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (No. 89-839) [hereinafter Joint
Appendix].
24. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This Note does not address situations
in which the individual has simply offered the statements without any initiation by law en-
forcement agencies or their agents. "Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the
Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-67
(1986).
25. See infra part I.F.
26. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104; Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157; Illinois
v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2399-400 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. Id. See Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Pierce v. United
States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896).
29. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
30. Id. at 542.
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criminal trials, ... wherever a question arises whether a confession is
incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that por-
tion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.' "31
The Court held that confessions must be free and voluntary if they
are to be admissible.32 By combining the common-law test for voluntari-
ness with the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court expressed concern
with the interrogator's conduct. The Court held that the interrogator's
conduct was a determinant to the extent that it compelled the defendant
to incriminate himself at trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege.33
B. State Court Development of Involuntary Confessions: Brown v.
Mississippi
The rule against involuntary confessions set down in Brain entailed
a Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege. At the time of the Brain
decision, however, this privilege against self-incrimination applied only
in federal courts.34 The Court had not yet determined that the Fifth
Amendment applied to the states.35 Therefore, the Brain decision was
not applicable to a state court determination of a confession's
voluntariness.
In Brown v. Mississippi,36 however, the United States Supreme Court
found state court cases in which the state's coercive conduct to extract a
confession was so deplorable that the use of the confession violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 In Brown, the de-
fendants were subjected to physical torture. The deputy sheriff and a
group of citizens hanged and whipped the defendants. 38 The deputy
sheriff told the defendants that the whipping would not cease until the
defendants confessed.39 The Court found that the state's conduct was
"revolting to the sense of justice."' The state's use at trial of the confes-
31. Id.
32. Id at 542-43. To be free and voluntary, confessions "must not be extracted by any
sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor
by the exertion of any improper influence." Id.
33. Id.
34. "[E]xemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not
secured by any part of the Federal Constitution." Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285
(1936) (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908)).
35. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285.
36. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
37. Id at 285-86. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I states that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... 
38. Brown, 297 U.S. at 280-81.
39. Id. at 281-82.
40. Id. at 286.
SvrinL, 19921 ARIZONA v. FULMINANTE
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sions obtained was a clear denial of due process.41
Twenty years later in Payne v. Arkansas,42 the Court found that psy-
chological as well as physical coercion violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause.43 In Payne, the defendant was held in jail for
two days without any charge against him.' The defendant was allowed
no phone calls or communication with counsel, friends, or family mem-
bers.4" On the second day, the police chief told the defendant that there
were thirty to forty people waiting outside of the police station for the
defendant that wanted to get him. The police chief stated that if the
defendant would tell him the truth, the police chief could probably keep
the people from coming in and getting the defendant." The Court found
that "there is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected
by fear as by force .... 7 Such psychological torture violated due
process.48
One year later in Spano v. New York,49 the Court held that the state
also violated due process when an individual's "will was overborne by
official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely aroused . . . 2 0 In
Spano, the defendant confided in an old friend, Bruno, that he had shot
the victim." Bruno, a young police officer, "relayed this information to
his superiors." 2 The defendant surrendered himself the following day.
After questioning the defendant throughout the night, the police in-
structed Bruno to falsely inform the defendant that Bruno's job was in
jeopardy because the defendant refused to confess. Bruno was supposed
"to extract sympathy from the defendant for Bruno's pregnant wife and
three children. 5, 3 The Court found that such conduct violated due pro-
cess.54 By 1959, a defendant's constitutional protection against egregious
police conduct was well established.
41. Id.
42. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
43. Id. at 561.
44. Id. at 563.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 564-65.
47. Id. at 566.
48. Id. at 567.
49. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
50. Id. at 323. See also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (several officers ques-
tioned the defendant for 36 hours without an opportunity for sleep); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961) (defendant was denied adequate food and medical attention for four days until
confession obtained).
51. 360 U.S. at 317.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 319.
54. Id. at 320.
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C. Application of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination to the States: Malloy v. Hogan
Although the deplorable tactics described in Brown and subsequent
cases produced inadmissible confessions that violated Fourteenth
Amendment due process, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply in state courts until the 1964 case of Malloy
v. Hogan."5 In Malloy, the Court stated that "the admissibility of a con-
fession in a state criminal prosecution is tested by the same standard ap-
plied in federal prosecutions" since Brain v. United States.56 Today, the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and the Four-
teenth Amendment due process protections are interpreted together to
prohibit the introduction of involuntary and coerced confessions at
trial.57
D. Modern Analysis of Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination and
Judicial Safeguards
1. Background: Miranda v. Arizona
In the years following Malloy, the United States Supreme Court be-
came increasingly concerned with the prevention of coerced confessions
that deny the accused the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination.51 The Court's analysis began to focus more on the police meth-
ods of extraction's effect on the defendant as opposed to the nature of the
methods themselves. In 1966, in Miranda v. Arizona, 9 the United States
Supreme Court broadened the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to cover custodial police interrogations ° To protect this
privilege, the Court enacted mandatory procedural safeguards for law
enforcement agencies and courts to follow. In short, the safeguards are
as follows: "[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. '61 These safeguards were sub-
sequently coined the "Miranda warnings" or "Miranda rights' 62 and
have remained in place up to the present day.
55. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
56. Id. at 7. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
57. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1986).
59. Id.
60. It at 467-68. The Court subsequently interpreted Miranda not to apply in custodial
interrogations in which the accused does not know that the interrogator is an undercover
agent. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990). See infra part I.D.3.
61. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
62. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
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The Miranda decision prohibited use of confessions obtained during
custodial interrogation unless the interrogator first advised the individual
of the Miranda rights. The Court based its decision on the inherently
coercive nature of custodial interrogations. An "individual swept from
familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic
forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion ... cannot be other-
wise than under compulsion to speak."6 Interestingly, the requirement
of advising a suspect of the Miranda rights is based on the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, 6" yet failure to warn a suspect
of the Miranda rights is not itself considered a constitutional violation."
Rather, it is the use at trial of the resulting unprotected confession that
violates the Constitution. Therefore, although a failure to warn a suspect
of the Miranda rights may lead to an involuntary confession, 66 a "de-
fendant's constitutional rights have been violated [only] if his conviction
is based, in whole or in part, on an involuntary confession. 67
2. Defining Custodial Interrogation
While the purpose of the Miranda warnings is to protect an individ-
ual from inherently coercive custodial interrogation that may lead to an
involuntary confession, the warnings are required only in certain situa-
tions. The police must give the warnings "only in those types of situa-
tions in which the concerns that powered the [Miranda] decisions are
implicated."68 Thus, the warnings are necessary only during a custodial
interrogation, which the Court defined as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."'69
Since Miranda, the Court has wrestled with the definition of custo-
dial interrogation. The Court has examined the meaning of the words
custodial and interrogation. While the Miranda warnings were designed
to protect against the inherent coerciveness of a police-dominated atmos-
phere, a coercive atmosphere alone may not be enough to require the
Miranda warnings. The individual must be under formal arrest or have
his or her freedom of movement restrained 0 to the degree that is associ-
63. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
64. Id. at 436.
65. "Miranda warnings therefore are 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,
but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is]
protected.'" New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1983) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
66. This is exactly what the Court in Miranda v. Arizona was trying to prevent. 384 U.S.
436.
67. Id. at 464 n.33.
68. Berkerner v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984).
69. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
70. In Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit stated that
"[tihe concept of 'restriction' is significant in the prison setting, for it implies the need for a
ARIZONA v. FULMINANTE
ated with formal arrest.71 The interrogation, however, does not have to
be in the form of official questioning. In Rhode Island v. Innis,72 the
Court concluded that "the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever
a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its func-
tional equivalent. '73 An agent's statements can constitute interrogation
if the agent reasonably should have known that the agent's statements or
actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.74
3. Recent Definition of Custodial Interrogation: Illinois v. Perkins
Of late, the Court has refined its definition of custodial interrogation
with respect to the use of an undercover jailhouse informant. In Illinois
v. Perkins,75 the Court held that no custodial interrogation exists if an
incarcerated suspect is unaware that he is speaking with an agent of the
police or government. 76  The Supreme Court decided that because
"[c]oercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect, ' 7 7 if the
suspect "considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers,
the coercive atmosphere is lacking."'78 In Perkins, Charlton, a former
fellow inmate of the defendant, informed the police that the defendant
had told Charlton in detail about a murder that the defendant claimed to
have committed in East St. Louis, Illinois. 79 Acting as undercover infor-
mants, Charlton and undercover agent John Parisi, were placed in the
defendant's celblock where they posed as escapees from a work release
program. The agents suggested to the defendant that they formulate a
plan to escape from the county jail.8 0 During a planning session, the
defendant stated that he thought his girlfriend could smuggle a gun to
them." Agent Parisi then asked the defendant if he had ever "done"82
anybody.83 The defendant answered in the affirmative, and described, in
lengthy detail, the East St. Louis murder.84 The state subsequently
showing that the officers have in some way acted upon the defendant so as to have 'deprived
[him] of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" Id at 428 (quoting Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. at 444). "In the prison situation, this necessarily implies a change in the sur-
roundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement."
589 F.2d at 428.
71. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
72. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
73. Id. at 300-01.
74. Id at 301.
75. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2397. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
78. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
79. Id at 2396.
80. Id
81. Id.
82. "Done" means killed in this context.
83. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396.
84. Id.
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charged the defendant with the East St. Louis murder, and the Supreme
Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the statements made to
Agent Parisi. The Court held that the Agent did not violate the defend-
ant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he
failed to give the defendant the Miranda warnings because the defendant
was not aware of his cell-mates' true identities as undercover agents.8 5 In
essence, the Court eliminated the Miranda procedural safeguards from
undercover custodial interrogations without regard for how restrained
the custody or how harsh the inquisition of the suspect was.
E. A Return to Fourteenth Amendment Due Process-The Modem
Focus: Miller v. Fenton
Although the Court continues to focus its statement admissibility
analysis on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the
Fifth Amendment analysis has not completely displaced the Fourteenth
Amendment due process analysis for coerced confessions. The Court has
"continued to measure [the admissibility of] confessions against the re-
quirements of due process"8 6 and "has long held that certain interroga-
tion techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique
characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized sys-
tem of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 " In Miller v. Fenton,"8 the
Court spelled out its method 9 for determining the voluntariness of a
statement under due process.90 The Court assessed the voluntariness of a
statement under the "totality of the circumstances:" 91 "[T]he Court...
assessed... all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics
of the accused and the details of the interrogation." 92 The Fenton case
stated that the Court must consider the "possibly vulnerable subjective
85. Id. at 2397.
86. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985).
87. Id. at 109.
88. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
89. The Court stated that "the ultimate issue of 'voluntariness' is a legal question requir-
ing independent federal determination." Id. at 110.
90. "[A] criminal defendant who challenges the voluntariness of a confession made to
officials and sought to be used against him at his trial has a due process right to a reliable
determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily given and not the outcome of coer-
cion which the Constitution forbids." Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478 (1972). See Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession,
the prosecution has the burden of proving that the statement is voluntary. Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. at 482-87. The Court stated that the minimum showing of proof that the prosecution
must meet is a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 489. The Court noted, however, that the
States are free to adopt a higher showing of proof for the prosecution. Id. Some lower courts
have required a showing of beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g. State v. Ragsdale, 187 So. 2d 427
(La. 1966); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970).
91. 474 U.S. at 111. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
92. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
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state" of the individual and the "subtly coercive police questions."93 In
applying the totality of the circumstances test in the future, the Court's
foremost question should be whether the statement was "the product of
an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."94
In addition to the "totality of the circumstances" test, the Court has
also held that it must determine whether "coercive police activity" was
present when the defendant confessed." "[C]oercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary'
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."96
F. A Two-Pronged Test for Admissibility: Illinois v. Perkins
As the Court stated in Mincey v. Arizona,97 both the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and Fourteenth Amendment
due process protections safeguard against the introduction of involun-
tary, coerced confessions.9" At times, however, the Court only makes an
inquiry into the adequacy of the Miranda safeguards against self-incrimi-
nation.99 If the Court concludes that the defendant was not given the
proper Miranda warnings, then it prohibits the introduction of the de-
fendant's statements. When the Court draws this conclusion, it is unnec-
essary for the Court to subsequently determine whether the defendant's
statements are actually voluntary. As noted in Miranda, the Court con-
cerns itself primarily with providing adequate safeguards in custodial in-
terrogations, and admits that in Miranda, the Court "might not [have
found] the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional
terms., 1°"
When the Court determines, however, that the Miranda warnings
are either properly given or unnecessary, it must still make a second in-
quiry into the voluntariness of the statements under the Due Process
Clause before it admits the statements.
In Illinois v. Perkins, the Court arguably incorporated its due pro-
cess inquiry into its determination of whether the Miranda warnings ap-
plied. The Court held that the coercive atmosphere necessary for a
custodial interrogation was lacking because the defendant did not know
93. Id. at 229.
94. "Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his con-
fession offends due process." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
95. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
96. Id.
97. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
98. Id. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
99. See, eg., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
100. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
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his cell-mates were undercover agents.10 1 The Court then concluded that
the defendant's statement's were voluntary because the defendant
"viewed the cellmate-agent as an equal and showed no hint of being in-
timidated by the atmosphere of the jail."'0 2 The Court's opinion shows
no evidence of a separate determination of the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation.0 3 Arguably, the Perkins decision
incorporated its totality of the circumstances test into its determination
of the existence of a custodial interrogation. Arizona v. Fulminante, the
most recent Supreme Court decision on this subject, however, shows that
the totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness remains a separate
inquiry from the determination of a custodial interrogation.
II. Arizona v. Fulminante
A. Background
The Perkins decision established that there is no need to give Mi-
randa warnings when an undercover agent interrogates an incarcerated
suspect about a crime unrelated to that for which the defendant is incar-
cerated. The decision failed, however, to set forth any guidelines for the
determination of whether such an interrogation violates due process in
similar surreptitious atmospheres. Recently, the Supreme Court faced
this question in Arizona v. Fulminante. °4 In Fulminante, the Court
found that a prisoner's confession to an undercover jailhouse informant
was involuntary and in violation of Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess.'0 5 This decision demonstrates that a thin line exists between those
statements that the Court finds acceptable and those that it does not.
The resulting lack of guidelines for lower courts and law enforcement
agencies is significant because it leaves a large gap in the protection of an
individual's due process rights and room for abuse by a jailhouse
informant.
B. Facts of Arizona v. Fulminante
In the fall of 1983, Oreste Fulminante was an inmate at Raybrook
Federal Correctional Institution in Raybrook, New York. 10 6 Fuhninante
101. 110 s. Ct. 2394, 2397 (1990).
102. Id. at 2398.
103. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment of the Court "[s]ince the only issue raised
at this stage of the litigation [was] the applicability of Miranda . . . ." Id. at 2399 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan further held that "[t]his is not to say that [he believed] the Con-
stitution condones the method by which the police extracted the confession in this case." Id.
104. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
105. Id. at 1253. The Court also held that the harmless error analysis applies to involun-
tary confessions, but that the state did not carry its burden of demonstrating that the admis-
sion of Fulminante's confession to Sarivola did not contribute to Fulminante's conviction. The
issue of harmless error, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
106. Id. at 1250.
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was imprisoned following his second conviction of possession of a firearm
by a felon. 7 During his time at Raybrook, Fulminante became friends
with Anthony Sarivola, a fellow inmate. Sarivola was serving a sixty day
sentence for extortion.' Unbeknownst to Fulminante, Sarivola was a
paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).' 9 Be-
cause Sarivola was once involved with organized crime, "Sarivola mas-
queraded as an organized crime figure."'1 0 Sarivola was an associate of
the Columbo crime family of New York. While a member of the crime
family, Sarivola also performed "police functions", for the Seagate Har-
bor Police.' 1 ' He was allegedly also a member of a five-person prison
commission, which purported to have some control over what went on at
Raybrook. 112 Fulminante was aware of Sarivola's involvement in organ-
ized crime and membership in the prison commission." 3
Fulminante and Sarivola became friends at Raybrook during Sep-
tember of 1983, and spent an average of seven hours together each
day." 4 During this time, Sarivola heard a rumor that Fulminante was
being investigated for the murder of Fulminante's stepdaughter, Jeneane
Hunt. 5 Sarivola questioned Fulminante a number of times about the
murder, but Fulminante denied having anything to do with it." 6 On
occasion, Fulminante would offer various stories as to what he believed
happened to his stepdaughter Jeneane.1 7 According to Sarivola, as the
rumors about Fulminante's. culpability spread, "a lot of people were
thinking of hurting [Fulminante] ... and he sort of needed somebody to
107. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 606 (Ariz. 1988). Fulminante had a previous crim-
inal history. In 1965, he had a felony conviction in New Jersey for impairing the morals of a
child, and in 1971, he had another conviction in New Jersey for "uttering a check with a
forged endorsement." IdL He was arrested in 1982 for possession of a firearm by a felon, and




111. Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 103. Sarivola was first associated with the Seagate
Harbor Police Department in August 1978 and left its full employment in November 1978. Id
at 103.
Sarivola claimed that he made a conscious distinction between his role as a police officer
and as a Columbo associate. Id. at 105. "[W]hen [he] put on the uniform, [he] enforced the
law, but when [he] got off duty, [he] was a gangster." Id
112. Id at 35.
113. Id
114. Id. at 80.
115. Id at 81. The child was eleven year old Jeneane Hunt, Fulminante's stepdaughter.
She disappeared from Mesa, Arizona in September of 1982. Her body was found on Septem-
ber 16, in the desert outside of Mesa. She had been shot twice in the head. State v. Fulminante,
778 P.2d 602, 605 (Ariz. 1988).
116. Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 81.
117. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1250 (1991). "During one conversation,
[Fulminante] told Sarivola that Jeneane had been killed by bikers looking for drugs; on an-
other occasion, he said he did not know what had happened." Id.
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back him up and help him ... people were starting to avoid him and
treat him like shit." 118 Sarivola said that Fulminante's "time was run-
ning short,"' 1 9 and that if Fulminante had not received some inside pro-
tection, Fulminante would have gone out of the prison "horizontally." 120
Sarivola testified that the other prisoners who were aware of the rumors
were plotting against Fulminante. These alleged reactions towards
Fulminante were based on the underlying theory that "most organized
crime figures and most criminals who have some sort of scruples""'2 be-
lieve that "children [are] a very soft point.... ."22 Although the prison-
ers may not react to the death of an adult, they would be disturbed
immensely by the murder of a child, especially one as heinous as the
murder of Jeneane Hunt.
On approximately October 20, 1983, Anthony Sarivola told his FBI
contact, Agent Walter Ticano, of the circulating rumor about Fulmi-
nante.1 23 In response, Ticano told Sarivola, "I gotta know the whole
story. Get me the whole story." '124 The following day, Sarivola informed
Ticano that Fulminante had confidentially confessed to Sarivola that he
had killed his stepdaughter.125 This confession ultimately led to the con-
viction of Fulminante for first degree murder and imposition of the death
sentence. 126
Sarivola claimed that his conversation with Fulminante occurred
during one of Sarivola and Fulminante's routine walks around the prison
walking track.127 Aware of the circulating rumors and aware that
Fulminante had repeatedly denied his involvement with Jeneane's mur-
der, Sarivola told Fulminante, "If you want my help you're gonna have
to be straight, if you're not straight, then fuck you."' 8  At this point,
118. Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 29.
119. Id. at 28.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 28-29. Sarivola conceded that "if a fellow prisoner is known to have sexually
assaulted and murdered a little child," he is "ostracized and possibly in danger from the gen-
eral [prison] population." Id. at 110.
123. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 606 (Ariz. 1988). After Sarivola was sentenced for
the crime of extortion, yet before he was sent to Raybrook, he contacted Agent Ticano and
proposed that he would give him information about organized crime members. Ticano and
Sarivola entered into an agreement that was approved by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 134-35.
124. Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 146.
125. Id. at 147-48. "Sarivola said that Fulminante said that he did not like his stepdaugh-
ter and accused her of causing problems between himself and his wife. Sarivola stated that
Fulminante stated that he took his stepdaughter out into the Arizona ... desert and killed her
with a .357 magnum handgun." d at 148.
126. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1251 (1991).
127. Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 82-83.
128. Id. at 29.
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Fulminante told Sarivola that he had "clipped" Jeneane Hunt.1 29
Although Sarivola believed that Fulminante did not have a reputation for
truthfulness, 3' he thought Fulminante was telling the truth at this point
because it was "one of the few times [Fulminante] became serious and
[was] not trying to put up a front about [the murder]." '31
Sarivola claimed that he and Fulminante spoke about the incident a
few times after the initial conversation.1 32 After Fulminante was released
from Raybrook on November 28, 1983,133 Sarivola and his fiancee,
Donna, picked Fulminante up at a local bus terminal. When Donna
asked Fulminante "if he had any relatives or friends he wished to see, "134
Fulminante stated that "he could not return to his home because he had
killed a little girl in Arizona." 131 On September 4, 1984, Fulminante was
indicted for first degree murder of Jeneane Hunt. 136
C. Court Analysis of Arizona v. Fulminante
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court 1 3 7 and agreed that Fulminante's statements to
Sarivola were involuntary. 138 Like the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Illinois v. Perkins, the Arizona court held that Fulminante's
statements were not subject to the Miranda protections because they
were not made during a custodial interrogation.139 It found that the co-
ercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation was not present. Unlike
their decision in Illinois v. Perkins, however, the United States Supreme
Court made an extensive inquiry into the "totality of the circumstances"
and concluded that "[t]he confession was obtained as a direct result of
extreme coercion and was tendered in the belief that the defendant's life
was in jeopardy .... ."I'
In examining the totality of the circumstances, the Court considered
various factors to determine whether the defendant's statement was made
voluntarily.141 Included as factors are mental and emotional characteris-
129. IdL at 83. Fulminante stated that he had taken her to the desert and shot her twice in
the head. Id
130. Id at 85.
131. Id at 86.
132. Ia
133. Sarivola had been released approximately six months earlier. State v. Fulminante, 778




137. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1261 (1991).
138. Id
139. 778 P.2d at 608.
140. 111 S. Ct. at 1252 (citing Fulminante, 778 P.2d at 608).
141. Id.
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ties of the accused. 42 "[A]s interrogators have turned to more subtle
forms of psychological persuasion, courts have found the mental condi-
tion of the defendant a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness'
calculus."' 43 The Court found that psychological and emotional charac-
teristics of Fulminante contributed to his compulsion to confess. 44
Fulminante possessed "low average to average intelligence" and
"dropped out of school in the fourth grade." 141 In addition, Fulminante
was "short in stature and slight in build." 146
Another factor that the Court considered was Fulminante's experi-
ence with incarceration. 47 Fulminante had been convicted of several
felonies in the past and had been imprisoned twice before.14 Although
Fulminante appeared to be a hardened criminal with enough experience
to take care of himself in jail and around criminals, this was not the case.
During an earlier imprisonment, Fulminante experienced difficulty in
adapting to the stress of prison life.' 49 "At twenty-six, he was so terrified
of being in the general prison population, that he was placed in protective
custody at his own request.... [Hie could not emotionally handle the
isolation of protective custody, and with no other alternative, a psychia-
trist had Fulminante committed to a psychiatric hospital."1' 0 Fulmi-
nante remained in the hospital for the duration of his prison sentence.' 5 '
Arguably, the Court concluded that Fulminante's prior bad experience
with protective custody made Fulminante more reluctant to seek safety
from the prison officials15 2 and more likely to be attracted to Sarivola's
offer of underworld protection.
In addition to Fulminante's character, his physical stature, and his
experience with crime, the Court examined Sarivola's actions as an un-
dercover informant.153 Fulminante believed that Sarivola was an organ-
142. Id. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1990).
143. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).
144. 111 S. Ct. at 1252 n.2.
145. Id. at 1252. Fulminante "has low average to average intelligence and no formal edu-
cation past the fourth grade." Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 22, Arizona v. Fulminante,
111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (No. 89-839) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
146. Ill S. Ct. at 1252 n.2. Fulminante was 5'3" tall, 42 years old, and weighed 118
pounds. Respondent's Brief, supra note 145, at 18.
147. 111 S. Ct. at 1252 n.2. The Court has also considered an individual's experience with
crime and crime detection. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961). One factor the Court
considered when deciding that Reck's statement was compelled is that "he had no prior crimi-
nal record or experience with the police." Ir. at 441.
148. See supra note 107.
149. Respondent's Brief, supra note 145, at 19.
150. Id. at 4. Fulminante "was admitted to a psychiatric hospital because of his emotional
condition and extreme fear of other inmates." Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 5. Fulminante also knew that he could not seek protection from sources outside
the prison because he was already a prime suspect in Jeneane's murder. Id.
153. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991).
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ized crime member 54 and an influential person in the prison
community.' 5 Sarivola knew that Fulminante was threatened with dan-
ger from the other inmates and had received rough treatment. 156 "Using
his knowledge of these threats, Sarivola offered to protect Fulminante in
exchange for a confession to Jeneane's murder... and 'in response to
Sarivola's offer of protection, [Fulminante] confessed.' ))157
D. Critique of Arizona v. Fulminante: The Roles of Subjective Fear
and Informant Conduct in the Court's Due Process Analysis
after Arizona v. Fulminante
Arizona v. Fulminante demonstrates how the state can surrepti-
tiously elicit coerced confessions through the use of a jailhouse inform-
ant. Like Illinois v. Perkins, the circumstances surrounding the
confession may not meet the custodial requirements for the Miranda
warnings. At first glance, the confession might appear to simply be an
inmate speaking or bragging to a fellow inmate. In Illinois v. Perkins, the
Court stated that "Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from
boasting about their criminal activities in front of persons whom they
believe to be their cellmates." 'l" Yet in reality, the state created environ-
ment may exact enough pressure to elicit an involuntary confession for
reasons other than the fact that a jailhouse informant is an undercover
agent. A jailhouse informant like Sarivola, with a reputation for violence
or organized crime connection, may exploit his position. By seeking out
and questioning the prisoner, an informant may make the prisoner fear
for his life. The prison atmosphere is especially conducive to creating
fear and intimidation.'1 9 Because of the situation, an individual may be-
154. Id. at 1250. The Court suggested that not only Sarivola's role as an organized crime
member, but "[his] position as Fulminante's friend, might well have made [Fulminante] partic-
ularly susceptible to the former's entreaties." Id at 1252 n.2.
155. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
157. 111 S. Ct. at 1252 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d at 609). While it appears
as though fear was the compelling force behind Fulminante's confession, he may have had
another reason for making the statements. As his friend, Fulminante knew that Sarivola had
organized crime contacts. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text. He commented to
Sarivola and his future wife, Donna, that he "wanted to make some money. He [wanted] to
get a nice car like [Sarivola's]. He wanted to know what was going on in the street .... " Joint
Appendix, supra note 23, at 167. One may argue that by befriending Sarivola, a known organ-
ized crime figure, Fulminante was attempting to further his future connections with organized
crime, and Fulminante's statements to Sarivola were simply a part of that plan.
158. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2398 (1990).
159. "A unique sub-culture and hierarchy exists within the prison system, which gives rise
to a number of coercive techniques that inmates regularly utilize against their peers. The
prison environment has been referred to as a 'controlled war' in which physical, psychological,
economic, and social victimization runs rampant." Martine Beamon, Illinois v. Perkins: Has
Our Criminal Justice System Turned from "Accusatorial" to "Inquisitorial?," 52 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 669, 681 (1991) (quoting LEE BOWKER, Victimizers and Victims in American Correc-
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come frightened, defensive, and highly susceptible to persuasion. A jail-
house informant can easily capitalize on an individual's pre-existing
fears.
After Arizona v. Fulminante, and in light of Illinois v. Perkins, lower
courts and law enforcement agencies are left with little insight into what
factors are critical to the Court's totality of the circumstances determina-
tion, specifically, the relationship between the defendant's subjective fear
and the informant's conduct. In Illinois v. Perkins, the Court concluded
that the defendant's statements were voluntary because the coercive ele-
ment found in a police-dominated atmosphere was lacking. 16° The Per-
kins Court held that the defendant was "motivated solely by the desire to
impress his fellow inmates" and that "[h]e spoke at his own peril."' 61
The Court did not, however, set forth the specific factors it examined in
making its determination of whether the statements were voluntary.
Rather, the Court made an objective determination of whether the de-
fendant was compelled to speak against his will. "62 The Court did not
examine the circumstances present to determine whether the defendant
harbored any subjective fear of the informants. In Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante, however, the Court adhered to the traditional "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test for voluntariness. The Court presented numerous
subjective factors, including evidence of the defendant's pre-existing
fears, that compelled the Court to find the defendant's statements invol-
untary. The Court, however, failed to offer insight into the weight that it
gave each contributing factor in its determination.
Arguably, the defendant in Perkins was not compelled to speak for
fear of his own life. Rather, he was motivated by his desire to assure his
fellow inmates that he was a worthwhile part of their plan to escape from
jail. His "fear" was that his cell mates would distrust his capabilities as a
member of their scheme.
In other circumstances, a jailhouse informant interrogation may re-
sult in "fear" in a defendant that is more serious than that in Illinois v.
Perkins. The "fear," however, may be of a lesser degree than the life or
death fear in Arizona v. Fulminante, and therefore not viewed by a court
as a significant factor in its due process determination. Like Sarivola, a
jailhouse informant with a reputation for violence may exploit that repu-
tation or the fears implicit in the prison setting as part of the undercover
role. In reaction, a prisoner may create stories of past criminal violence
to boost his or her own standing.163
tional Institutions, in THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 63 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds.,
1982)).
160. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
161.' Id. at 2398.
162. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
163. Kathryn Young-Sook Kim, Comment, Self-Incrimination, Compulsion, and the Un-
dercoverAgent, 66 WASH. L. REV. 605, 618 (1991).
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Recently a California Superior Court in Napa County considered a
situation in which the defendant manufactured his confession as a result
of his fear for the jailhouse informant.' 4 On January 24, 1988, Robert
Torres' 65 wrote a letter to the Napa Police Department, alleging that
Richard Hammond told him that he had committed a contract murder
of someone named "Bruce" on May 13, 1986, and had put Bruce's naked
body in the Napa River.166 Torres stated that Hammond feared going
into the prison yard, even after Torres offered to get him a weapon. 167
Torres believed that Hammond told him the story either because of who
Torres was, what he represented, or just to impress him. 68 Hammond
knew that Torres was an organized crime member with a reputation for
ordering and committing murders. 169 The police paid Torres $500 and
arranged for him to go to Folsom Prison to interrogate Hammond. 70
The police gave Torres specific questions to ask Hammond, and Ham-
mond subsequently gave Torres a detailed, but incorrect description of
the death of Bruce Wayne Birdsong. 17' Nevertheless, Hammond was
tried for the murder of Birdsong. 172
In People v. Hammond, the causal connection between Hammond's
state of mind and his reasons for making the statements to Torres was
Hammond's subjective fear of Torres and the prison surroundings.
Hammond feared Torres' reputation and the prison community. Torres
and the police knew about this fear and used it to their advantage to elicit
a confession from Hammond. Hammond's statement ultimately proved
to be unreliable, yet he was arrested and tried based solely upon the con-
tents of his confession.
The Hammond case demonstrates that an incarcerated suspect may
be compelled to speak for reasons other than the awareness that the sus-
pect is in a police-dominated atmosphere. The fear and intimidation in-
herent in a prison atmosphere may force an individual such as
Fulminante to exchange incriminating statements for protection from the
informant. The reputation of the informant or threats or promises made
during interrogation may instill a fear in the individual that compels him
or her to offer a confession to the informant. In Arizona v. Fulminante,
164. People v. Hammond, No. 86-02755-03 (Napa Co. Sup. Ct. 1990).
165. Torres was a Mexican Mafia member who was trying to quit organized crime with the
help of the federal authorities. He occupied a cell next to defendant, Richard Hammond, who
was serving a sentence for a burglary conviction. Telephone interview with David Murray,
Attorney for Richard Hammond (Feb. 28, 1991).
166. d On May 20, 1986, a naked body was found floating in the Napa River and was






172. Hammond was acquitted of the murder. Id
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the Court gave very little guidance to future determinations of whether
or not a defendant's will is overcome by a jailhouse informant interroga-
tion. While the Court's analysis adhered to the traditional "totality of
the circumstances test" for voluntariness under Fourteenth Amendment
due process, it failed to offer any insight into the weight it gives each
factor in its determination. In addition, Fulminante did not provide limi-
tations for a jailhouse informant's conduct before the informant interro-
gates an individual. This lack of guidance in using a jailhouse informant
contributes to the dangers inherent in that informant's role in law en-
forcement and adds weight to the argument in favor of limiting the use of
a jailhouse informant.
III. The Use of Jailhouse Informants
A. Background
Use of informants by law enforcement agencies has become a stan-
dard practice,173 and is an "invaluable [source] of information for every
law enforcement agency ... ."'I Because a jailhouse informant acts as
an agent of the state, an informant's conduct is equivalent to conduct by
the state and is subject to constitutional limitations. 175 Due to the nature
of the compensation and incentive system for a jailhouse informant, how-
ever, there is a wide potential for abuse of the informant's position and
violation of constitutional rights. Therefore, the utility of the role of the
jailhouse informant in criminal law must be examined closely.
B. Compensation and Unreliability of Confessions
A law enforcement agency may compensate an informant for infor-
mation in a variety of ways. The agent may give the informant "direct
financial remuneration" 176 or "leniency regarding charges pending."'1 77
In other circumstances, the informant may be an ordinary citizen who
has "observed and reported an item of significance."' 178 When the agency
compensates the informant, the informant's actions may be based on a
personal gain. This gain may outweigh the legitimate desire of a just
conviction. The desire for personal gain makes the reliability of the in-
formation questionable.
In the past few years, commentators have criticized rewarding all
informant cooperation with money or other methods. 179  Critics have
173. Haglund, supra note 16, at 1407.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
176. Haglund, supra note 16, at 1408-09.
177. Id. at 1409.
178. Id
179. See Haglund, supra note 16; Jana Winograde, Jailhouse Informants and the Need for
Judicial Use Immunity in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 78 CAL. L. REv. 755 (1990).
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argued for limitations on the use of criminal jailhouse informants.18 0
The rationale of limiting the use of informants is mainly due to the unre-
liability of the information received.' 18  One opponent of informant com-
pensation has stated: "If you have to give ... jail-house [informants]
something to get them to testify, then their testimony is worthless.
You've bought their testimony."' 18
2
To reinforce the argument that jailhouse informants are unreliable,
commentators cite the case of Los Angeles County jailhouse informant,
Leslie White. White admitted that "he could create a confession by a jail
inmate he had never met," ' 3 and "had committed perjury 'in one or
more cases.., in [his] capacity as an informant for the district attorney's
office.' "1184
Arizona v. Fulminante demonstrates how use of a jailhouse inform-
ant may result not only in a coerced confession, but an unreliable one as
well. Sarivola worked for the FBI while serving his sentence and, in ex-
change, received immunity from prosecution by the government.1 8 5
Sarivola also received payment from the FBI for his services. This pay-
ment varied according to the quality of the information he provided.18 6
Although the FBI did not pay Sarivola for any of the information con-
nected with the Fulminante case, the Mesa, Arizona Police Department
subsequently compensated Sarivola for providing the information. 1 87
From Sarivola's standpoint, a denial of murder would not result in
as much compensation for Sarivola as would Fulminante's confession.
Although there is no evidence that this factor motivated Sarivola,88 it
demonstrates the pressure on an informant to create a situation in which
the outcome is most favorable to her.
C. Improper Techniques
In addition to opposing the use of a jailhouse informant because of
the unreliability of the extracted statements, commentators have claimed
that the information may be the product of improper techniques. To
180. Hallye Jordan, Bill Introduced To Limit use of Jailhouse Informants, L.A. DAILY J.,
Mar. 17, 1989 at 1.
181. Haglund, supra note 16, at 1415.
182. Jordan, supra note 180, at 1.
183. Tall Tales, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 22, 1988, at 6.
184. Haglund, supra note 16,-at 1416 (quoting L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1988, pt. II, at 1).
185. Agent Ticano claimed that as "long as he's [Sarivola] admitted criminal activity in the
past, he'll not be prosecuted for it." Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 157. It was further
agreed that if Sarivola was prosecuted for any other violation of the law by any other law
enforcement authorities, the FBI "[would] bring to the attention of those prosecuting authori-
ties the cooperation which [Sarivola] furnished in connection with [the above] agreement." Id.
186. Id. at 79.
187. Id. at 88.
188. Note that Sarivola had been found guilty of forging tape recorded conversations in
other situations. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1259 n.2 (1991).
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gather the information that will make a confession appear plausible, in-
formants have employed a variety of techniques that range from the art-
ful to the crude. 18 9 "They have conned fellow prisoners, even those who
have insisted on their innocence ... ."190
One improper technique is the use or threat of violence. Arizona v.
Fulminante shows how an informant may use the threat of violence to
compel a defendant to speak. In Fulminante, however, the threat of vio-
lence was two-fold. Fulminante was in danger of violence from the other
inmates.1 9 ' Sarivola used this threat of violence against Fulminante. He
offered Fulminante protection if Fulminante would tell him the truth.
Second, Sarivola's reputation emitted an air of violence. Sarivola was a
member of the Columbo crime family'92 and had been convicted of
crimes involving the "use [of] force or the threat of physical force in the
collection of shylarking debts."' 93 Arguably, Fulminante feared that if
he did not cooperate with Sarivola, either the prison inmates or Sarivola
himself would hurt Fulminante. Through this twofold threat of violence,
Sarivola was able to take advantage of Fulminante and elicit a confession
by using improper techniques.
D. Balancing the Dangers of Using Jailhouse Informants with Social
Policies Favoring Their Use
Inherent in a system that compensates and rewards jailhouse infor-
mants is the potential that an informant will abuse his position and vio-
late an individual's constitutional rights. Arguably, however, this flaw in
the role of a jailhouse informant is secondary in importance to an inform-
ant's function of ultimately placing information about criminal activity
in the hands those able to use it to protect society. Therefore, the argu-
ments in favor of protecting the constitutional rights of a confessor by
opposing the use of a jailhouse informant must be balanced against the
social utility of employing an informant.
A police jailhouse informant provides a valuable tool for the effec-
tive apprehension of violent criminals. 94 Informants are now indispen-
sable to agencies that investigate 'victimless' crimes."' "The use of
informants is now part and parcel of law enforcement work. Informants
189. Haglund, supra note 16, at 1416 n.59.
190. Id.
191. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
192. Agent Ticano was the case agent responsible for the initial arrest of Sarivola. Joint
Appendix, supra note 23, at 155.
193. Id. at 158. Shylarking is a term used to describe an extortionate credit transaction,
the crime for which Sarivola was originally arrested. Id.
194. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973); Haglund, supra note 16, at
1410.
195. Narcotics, gambling, prostitution, and tax-evasion are examples of victimless crimes.
Haglund, supra note 16, at 1411.
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are invaluable sources of information for every law enforcement agency
1,196
Of equal value, however, is the belief that the criminal law should
not be used as an instrument of unfairness.197 Arguably, protecting the
constitutional rights of a confessor outweighs the needs of society and
protective law enforcement. This idea stems from the deep-rooted feeling
that "in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal
methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves." 198
The Court's decision in Arizona v. Fulminante strengthens the belief
that the dangers in using a jailhouse informant outweigh societal needs
for an informant in effective law enforcement. The Court concluded that
the acceptability of a confession made to a jailhouse informant turns on a
subjective factor-the "totality of the circumstances" involved in making
the confession. 199 A case-by-case subjective analysis makes it very diffi-
cult for law enforcement agencies to determine in advance if a specific
interrogation will be considered improper. Only after statements are
made during the interrogation, however, will the Court determine
whether the statements were voluntary. But the Court will determine
whether or not the defendant's constitutional rights were violated.
The Court has also made it difficult to determine when a jailhouse
informant is using "strategic deception by taking advantage of [the] sus-
pect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner"'2°° and
when an informant is using coercion to obtain a confession. When the
jailhouse informant intentionally creates a situation, he may be exploiting
the prisoner's latent fears of the informant and the surroundings, a seem-
ingly amicable atmosphere turning into one of intense pressure. On judi-
cial review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, the intensity of the defendant's fears of the jailhouse inter-
rogation and compulsion to speak may not be apparent to the reviewer.
Because of the intimidating atmosphere that is unique to the prison envi-
ronment, "even the most innocuous police tactics could have a coercive
effect. ,20 1
196. Id at 1407. "In one recent year alone, the FBI reported using 2,800 informants.
During the previous year, the FBI reported paying ... 1.5 million dollars to informants,
resulting in 2,600 arrests." Id at 1411.
197. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. See also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
198. Spano, 360 U.S. at 321.
199. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
200. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2397 (1990).
201. Beamon, supra note 159, at 682.
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IV. Proposal
After Illinois v. Perkins and Arizona v. Fulminante, the notion that
there is room for government abuse in interrogating incarcerated sus-
pects at the expense of the suspect's due process rights remains a predica-
ment. Minimal guidelines, however, on the use of a jailhouse informant,
may provide protection of a prisoner's constitutional rights while aiding
law enforcement.
Eliminating tangible incentives may help to reduce the likelihood
that the jailhouse informant will abuse her privilege to improperly seek
information and provide unreliable statements. Intangible incentives
such as promoting justice or seeking revenge will still exist, but the major
opportunities for informant abuse will be eliminated. A jailhouse inform-
ant will be less likely to fabricate or misrepresent a suspect's statements
when that informant's personal interest and expectations in eliciting the
information are reduced.
Moreover, restricting the jailhouse informant to a passive role may
help to avoid coercion. As previously noted,2 "2 if thejailhouse informant
merely overhears a free and voluntary confession, the issue of coercive
interrogation is not present. The informant does not confront the incar-
cerated suspect and the suspect is not subjected to answering seemingly
pressing questions. In addition, a passive jailhouse informant is not in-
tentionally placed in the suspect's environment. Therefore, the intimidat-
ing pressure a suspect may encounter with an informant's intentional and
unsolicited invasion of the suspect's place in the prison setting is avoided.
While these minimal guidelines may help to reduce the likelihood
that a jailhouse informant will abuse his role, guidelines alone are not
complete safeguards against the possible violation of a defendant's consti-
tutional rights. Courts should also give great weight to the fact that an
interrogation takes place in a prison community and is not extracted
from the defendant by a law enforcement officer, but by another criminal.
Where the government follows adequate guidelines in its use ofjailhouse
informants, and where courts consider the unique setting of a prison
community, the social utility of a jailhouse informant should, in theory,
outweigh the danger the informant poses to the constitutional rights of a
suspect.
Conclusion
As a result of Illinois v. Perkins and Arizona v. Fulminante, an incar-
cerated suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and due process protection against coerced confessions to a jailhouse in-
formant have been restricted. Because the suspect is not aware that he or
she is speaking to law enforcement agents, the requisite coercive atmos-
202. See supra note 24.
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phere for custodial interrogation is not present. Thus, the jailhouse in-
formant is not required to inform the suspect of the Miranda warnings
before the informant questions the suspect. While Arizona v. Fulminante
decided that the Court will continue to examine the totality of the cir-
cumstances of the interrogation, Fulminante does not provide sufficient
insight into what specific factors a lower court must consider and how
much weight should be accorded each element. Furthermore, it fails to
offer any guidelines to law enforcement agencies before using a jailhouse
informant to interrogate a suspect.
Because of the Fulminante decision, a jailhouse informant is given
wide latitude in his conduct. Inherent in the agency relationship between
the informant and the government is the danger of the informant's per-
sonal motives to influence the informant's behavior. As a result, an in-
formant may offer unreliable information. In addition, an informant
may employ improper, coercive techniques in eliciting a suspect's state-
ments. Such techniques, alone or in combination with a suspect's per-
sonal fears, may overcome the will of the suspect and violate due process.
In sum, the Fulminante decision and the inherent nature of the posi-
tion of the jailhouse informant weigh strongly in favor of limiting or
prohibiting an informant's role in prison interrogations. Although an in-
formant's utility in contributing to effective law enforcement is strong,
the potential abuse present in using the informant in the unique prison
atmosphere outweighs the informant's social value. Therefore, use of the
jailhouse informant in prison interrogations of incarcerated suspects
should be sharply curtailed.
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